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National	Security	Council:	why	it	would	be	unwise	for
Johnson	to	reduce	its	role
Celia	G.	Parker	writes	that	albeit	not	being	perfect,	the	National	Security	Council	provides	the
best	system	the	UK	has	had	for	the	discussion	and	implementation	of	national	security
strategy.	Failing	to	employ	it	as	it	was	designed	may	result	in	a	less	effective,	less	transparent,
and	less	accountable	national	security	decision-making	system.	
In	2010,	former	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	and	his	coalition	government	introduced	a
range	of	reforms	to	the	UK’s	national	security	machinery,	with	the	aim	of	creating	a	‘Strong
Britain	in	an	Age	of	Uncertainty’.	Ten	years	later,	in	the	midst	of	a	global	pandemic	and	with	the
UK’s	future	relationship	with	the	EU	still	unclear,	it	could	be	assumed	that	the	objective	of		Boris	Johnson’s
government	would	be	the	same.	However,	some	of	the	improvements	to	the	national	security	machinery	since	2010
have	been	scaled	back	in	the	past	year,	especially	since	the	December	2019	General	Election.	Reports	suggested
that	the	National	Security	Council	(NSC),	designed	as	the	home	of	strategic	decision-making	on	national	security
and	a	focal	point	of	the	2010	reforms,	did	not	meet	at	all	between	January	and	July	2020.	Although	the	pandemic
doubtless	provided	a	significant	distraction	to	Johnson,	who	chairs	the	NSC,	COVID-19	itself	should	have	been
reason	for	the	NSC	to	meet	regularly.	Its	rare	use	this	year	and	the	political	appointment	of	David	Frost,	Johnson’s
current	chief	negotiator	with	the	EU,	as	National	Security	Adviser	(NSA)	have	both	brought	into	question	what	the
future	holds	for	the	NSC	and	the	other	structures	created	by	the	2010	reforms.
The	NSC	is	not	perfect.	Despite	having	been	designed	to	improve	a	perceived	weakness	in	how	long-term	national
security	strategy	was	formulated	and	implemented,	it	has	been	accused	of	focusing	too	much	on	tactical	rather	than
strategic	issues,	the	former	of	which	should	be	dealt	with	at	the	Cabinet	Office	Briefing	Rooms,	or	elsewhere.	There
has	been	some	serious	criticism	from	those	who	have	interacted	with	it	in	recent	years,	for	example	from	former
Conservative	Cabinet	member	Rory	Stewart,	who	described	it	as	a	‘joke’.	However,	before	Johnson’s	premiership,
the	NSC	had	made	some	significant	improvements	to	national	security	decision-making.	For	example,	the	NSC
forum	marked	a	departure	from	the	days	of	former	Prime	Minister	Tony	Blair’s	often	opaque,	sofa	government	style
of	interacting	with	intelligence	and	security	officials.	The	NSC	instead	reflected	the	British	tradition	of	Cabinet
committees	and	collegiate	decision-making	on	national	security	and	intelligence	issues.	Reports	earlier	this	year	of
the	heated	discussions	about	Huawei’s	involvement	in	the	UK’s	5G	network	also	suggest	that	the	NSC	had	finally
facilitated	the	challenge	function	which	had	been	missing	in	the	early	years	of	its	life	and	before	its	creation,
particularly	under	Blair’s	premiership.
One	of	the	most	important	improvements	made	to	the	system	by	the	creation	of	the	NSC	is	the	theoretical	reduction
in	the	impact	of	the	personality	of	prime	ministers	on	the	use	of	intelligence,	mainly	as	a	result	of	the	more	formal
system	of	interaction	between	intelligence	and	policymakers,	which	the	NSC	enables.	However,	as	I	argued	earlier
in	2020,	the	NSC	is	neither	a	permanent	nor	a	statutory	body,	and	so	its	effectiveness	remains	at	the	whim	of	the
prime	minister	of	the	day.	Its	use	since	Johnson’s	2019	General	Election	victory	is	a	case	in	point.	Under	former
prime	ministers	Cameron	and	Theresa	May,	the	NSC	met	most	weeks	(chaired	by	the	PMs	themselves)	and	was
used	as	the	forum	to	make	significant	national	security	decisions.	Johnson,	on	the	other	hand,	has	not	regularly
convened	the	NSC.	There	were	even	reports	that	NSC	meetings	have	been	cancelled	as	a	result	of	disagreements
with	his	Cabinet	colleges,	a	sign	that	Johnson	has	not	been	using	the	NSC	as	the	clearing	house	for	discussions	on
national	security.
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Although	Johnson’s	non-use	of	the	NSC	began	before	the	COVID-19	pandemic	took	over	the	government’s	focus
this	year,	the	government	has	attributed	the	pandemic	to	the	disruption.	Not	only	was	the	pandemic	itself	a
disruption,	but	Johnson’s	own	ill-health	would	have	postponed	at	least	his	involvement	in	the	NSC	meeting.	An
explanation,	therefore,	for	the	NSC’s	absence	could	be	Johnson’s	desire	to	keep	control	of	its	chairmanship,
suggesting	his	leadership	style	is	more	authoritarian	than	collegiate	in	nature,	as	was	Cameron’s.	Another
indication	of	Johnson’s	leadership	style,	and	his	attitude	towards	an	objective	and	challenge-orientated	role	for	the
NSC,	is	his	recent	appointment	of	Frost	as	the	new	NSA.	This	position	has	traditionally	been	filled	by	a	career	civil
servant	with	experience	working	with	the	UK’s	intelligence	and	security	machinery.	The	outgoing	postholder,	Sir
Mark	Sedwill,	for	example,	spent	a	career	working	within	or	alongside	the	military,	Home	Office	and	Foreign	and
Commonwealth	Office,	giving	him	the	experience	required	to	fulfil	such	an	important	bridging	role	between
politicians	and	government	experts	on	national	security.	It	has	yet	to	be	seen	how	the	political	appointment	of	Frost
as	NSA	will	change	nature	of	this	role.	It	may	well	shift	the	balance	from	objective	arbitrator	between	Number	10
and	national	security	officials	to	Number	10’s	representative	on	national	security.	If	this	does	transpire,	some	of	the
positive	impact	of	the	2010	reforms	will	certainly	have	been	lost.
In	terms	of	the	NSC’s	role	in	relation	to	the	pandemic,	its	absence	until	July	2020	is	difficult	to	justify.	Without	doubt,
the	pandemic	required	rapid	tactical	and	operational	decision-making,	neither	of	which	should	have	been	done	at
the	NSC.	However,	the	pandemic	has	also	created	a	range	of	long-term	national	security	challenges,	beyond	the
obvious	review	of	the	UK’s	relationship	with	China.	Health	security	has	jumped	to	the	top	of	the	agenda,
presumably	resulting	in	a	shift	of	the	resources	allocated	by	intelligence	and	security	officials	towards	this	new	area
of	focus	(although,	as	many	commentators	have	argued,	the	threat	of	a	pandemic	has	been	on	the	national	security
agenda	for	much	longer).	In	2014,	Cameron	laid	out	his	widened	definition	of	national	security	to	include
environmental	and	health	threats,	and	recent	commentators	have	suggested	the	definition	be	widened	even	further,
partly	as	a	result	of	the	pandemic.	The	Royal	United	Service	Institute	(RUSI),	for	example,	has	argued	that	the
planned	Integrated	Review	being	undertaken	by	the	government	into	national	security	and	defence	should,	for	the
first	time,	bring	economic	security	and	financial	services	into	the	national	security	agenda.	Quite	properly,	the
financial	health	of	the	country	has	been	interwoven	with	the	government’s	response	to	the	pandemic,	so	this	is	a
logical	extension.
Without	meeting,	however,	the	NSC	cannot	tackle	any	of	these	challenges.	If	used	as	designed,	the	NSC	and	its
accompanying	bodies,	like	the	National	Security	Secretariat,	provide,	arguably,	the	best	system	the	UK	has	had	for
the	discussion	and	implementation	of	national	security	strategy.	On	the	contrary,	failing	to	employ	it	as	it	was
designed	may	well	result	in	a	significantly	less	effective,	less	transparent,	and	less	accountable	national	security
decision-making	system.	At	a	time	when	the	UK	needs	all	the	strategic	strength	it	can	muster,	this	should	not	be	the
government’s	approach.
_______________________
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